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Abstract–Behavioural factors play a key and pivotal role in the 
success of a voluntary vaccination programme for combating 
infectious diseases. Individuals usually base their voluntary 
vaccination decisions on the perceived costs of vaccination and 
infection. The perceived cost of vaccination is easily influenced 
by the degree of protection conferred by vaccines against 
infection, also known as vaccine efficacy. Although certain 
vaccines have a decrease in its effectiveness in specific duration 
of time, they do offer a reduction of transmissibility and faster 
recovery for vaccinated infected individuals. These additional 
characteristics of imperfect vaccines are well-captured in an 
epidemic model with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity. 
In this paper, the interplays between these characteristics of 
vaccines, the dynamics of vaccination uptake and epidemics are 
investigated in the vaccination population games framework. 
Specifically, we study to what extent the population- and 
individual-level vaccination rates are influenced by these 
characteristics of vaccines at equilibrium state.  
 
Index Terms–Two Classes of Vaccine-Induced Immunity; 
Vaccination Population Games; Vaccine Efficacy.    
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In modelling the voluntary vaccination behaviour on the 
disease spread by using game-theoretical approach (see 
review paper [1]), at microscopic level, upon receiving 
information on the diseases, susceptible individuals (i.e. the 
players of the game) decide whether or not to take vaccination 
(i.e. choosing vaccination or non-vaccination strategy) based 
on perceived costs of vaccination and disease. Individuals 
aim at minimizing the cost (i.e. maximizing the payoff). By 
opting for vaccination strategy, it is generally assumed that 
individuals get vaccinated immediately and the vaccine 
provides immunity against infection risks completely. 
However, if the assumption of perfect vaccine is relaxed, the 
perceived cost of vaccination could be vastly altered by the 
degree of protection offered by vaccines, which is highly 
associated with the vaccine efficacy and vaccine failure.  
The vaccine efficacy is referred to as the theoretical success 
rate in preventing vaccinated individuals from becoming 
infected with the disease [2]. In reviewing the literature, it is 
not uncommon that the assumptions about perfect vaccine 
efficacy are further relaxed so as to better reflecting the 
complexity of epidemic dynamics with vaccination. When 
vaccine is imperfect, the critical vaccination threshold for 
disease eradication becomes higher [3] due to the fact that 
being vaccinated does not necessarily confer vaccine-induced 
immunity. In general, vaccine failure could be categorized 
into the following three types. First, vaccine failure in take 
(“all-or-nothing”) which means that vaccine may not be able 
to generate immunity in a portion of people vaccinated [4]. 
Second, vaccine may not only offer partial protection to 
vaccinated individuals by lowering individuals’ susceptibility 
to infection, but also reduce the subsequent transmissibility 
and speed up recovery if the vaccinated individuals suffer 
from infection (i.e. breakthrough infection). This type of 
vaccine could be described as “leaky” in [4-5] or formally 
grouped as vaccine failure in degree. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) [6] claims that if a person 
vaccinated with chickenpox vaccine does catch the disease, it 
is typically not that serious compared to other non-
vaccinators. Also, he/she may be able to recover faster. Third, 
the vaccine- and disease-induced immunity for quite a 
number of diseases fade with time, i.e. vaccine failure in 
duration [4,7]. Take the pertussis (whooping cough) vaccine 
as an example. For adolescents and adults, the vaccine could 
provide protection to roughly 7 out of 10 people in their first 
year after receiving the vaccine, whereas it just protects 3 or 
4 out of 10 people perfectly in four years after being 
vaccinated [8]. 
In voluntary vaccination program, individuals do not 
usually get vaccinated simultaneously. It follows that the 
population may consist of vaccinated individuals with fully 
protective vaccine-induced immunity, together with those 
who only have partial protection. This coexistence of fully 
and partially protected vaccinated individuals as well as its 
epidemic dynamics are well-captured in a Susceptible-
Vaccinated-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible (SVIRS) epide-
mic model with two classes of vaccine-induced immunity [9], 
in which vaccinated individuals first acquire high vaccine-
induced immunity with full protection from the disease. 
Then, their immunity wanes in two stages, namely from high 
to low immunity (i.e. individuals still have some partial 
protection) and from low to no immunity. In addition, the 
extended model in [9] also assumes that in breakthrough 
infections, the vaccine may be able to reduce transmissibility 
and speed up recovery for vaccinated infected individuals. 
Hence, the model is particularly useful for studying the 
epidemic dynamics with vaccine failure in degree and in 
duration. 
It could be postulated that people would not choose to 
vaccinate until the vaccine was sufficiently efficient in 
protecting vaccinated individuals from being infected, 
moreover, an increase in vaccine efficacy would boost the 
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vaccination rates. Having said that, when rational individuals 
act in their self-interest, free-riding effects can cause the 
vaccine uptake drops when the vaccine efficacy is high [10]. 
For vaccine immunity with low waning rate, vaccine 
coverage level is usually low but stable [11]. The reason is 
that the longer duration of protection given by the vaccine, 
the lower awareness of infection risk among susceptibles will 
be, and this usually cause severe infrequent epidemics [12]. 
The probability of non-vaccinating increases when vaccine is 
imperfect and this pose extra burden to the overall cost of 
optimum vaccination strategy [13]. It is found that the disease 
may invade in scale-free networks as vaccination behaviour 
is hard to spread across the population whenever the 
vaccination cost exceeds its threshold value for the vaccine 
imperfection [14]. Another likely consequence of the 
imperfect vaccine on voluntary vaccination behaviour is the 
phenomenon of multiple equilibria vaccination rates [15]. 
In light of the above-mentioned literatures, there exists an 
important interplay between vaccine imperfection, 
vaccination coverage and disease dynamics. But, these 
findings could be further elaborated by adding the definition 
of vaccine efficacy such that they are not simply limited to 
the reduction of susceptibility for vaccinated individuals. 
However, the influence of some other characteristics of 
imperfect vaccines (namely, the transition rate from high to 
low immunity for vaccinated individuals, the reduction of 
transmissibility and faster recovery in breakthrough 
infection) on individual vaccination decision-making has 
received relatively few attentions.  
Hence, in this paper, we make use of the SVIRS epidemic 
model with a two-class vaccine-induced immunity and 
additional characteristics of imperfect vaccine in [9], along 
with the vaccination population games framework [15], to 
explore the influence of these characteristics of vaccine 
failure in degree on the individual and population vaccination 
rates as well as the consequent effects on epidemic dynamics, 
without focussing on a specific vaccine-preventable disease. 
Besides that, the set of parameter values is purposely chosen 
to illustrate certain specific scenario or principle and explain 
the dynamical behaviour which the model can exhibit.  
In Section II, we present the details of vaccination 
population games for two-class vaccine-induced immunity 
model. Results are discussed in Section III and conclusion is 
given in Section IV.   
 
II. MODEL FORMULATION 
 
We develop the continuous-vaccination population game 
model for epidemic SVIRS dynamics (without demography) 
with two-class vaccine-induced immunity by taking into 
account the three additional characteristics of imperfect 
vaccines in the following four subsections. 
  
A. Population-scale dynamics  
The population-scale dynamics is given below: 
 
?̇? = −𝑆 − ̅𝑆 + 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑉𝑉2 
𝐼̇ = 𝑆 − 
𝑢
𝐼 
?̇? = 𝑉2 − 𝑣𝑊 
?̇? = 
𝑢
𝐼 + 
𝑣
𝑊 − 𝑅𝑅 
𝑉1̇ = ̅𝑆 − 1𝑉1 
𝑉2̇ = 1𝑉1 − 𝑉2 − 𝑉𝑉2 
(1) 
   
where dot represents time derivative. All variables and 
parameters in the model are listed in Table 1. The total 
population at time t, N(t), is divided into six compartments 
(or classes, states). We specifically denote the vaccination 
rate, ̅, with bar notation to emphasize that the quantity is of 
average population rate. The susceptibles, S, shift to the 
unvaccinated infected class, I, at the rate . We assume that 
individuals in the V1 class are fully protected from infection 
with high vaccine-induced immunity until they progress to 
the V2 class at a rate 1, in which they only have partial 
protection with low vaccine-induced immunity. When 
individuals in the V2 class suffer the breakthrough infection, 
they transfer to the vaccinated infected class, W, at a rate of 
 where  (0,1] is the probability of vaccine failure. 
Vaccinated infected individuals have faster recovery than 
unvaccinated infected individuals (i.e. 
𝑢
 
𝑣
). We assume 
that individuals in W class have reduction of transmissibility, 
 (0,1]. Hence, the force of infection is given by  =
 
𝐼+ 𝑊
𝑁
.     
 
Table 1 
Description of the variables and parameters of the model (1) 
 
Variables Description 
S 
I 
W 
R 
V1 
V2 
Susceptible individuals 
Unvaccinated and infected individuals 
Vaccinated and infected individuals 
Recovered individuals 
Vaccinated individuals with high vaccine-induced 
immunity 
Vaccinated individuals with low vaccine-induced 
immunity  
Parameters Description 
 
 
 
̅ 
 
Force of infection  
Disease transmission rate 
Reduction of transmissibility for individuals in W 
class 
Population vaccination rate  
Reduction of susceptibility for vaccinated individuals 
in V2 class; or equivalently, the probability of vaccine 
failure in degree, where 1   gives vaccine efficacy   
R 
V 
Disease-induced immunity waning rate  
Vaccine-induced immunity waning rate 
u 
v 
1 
Recovery rate for unvaccinated infected individuals 
Recovery rate for vaccinated infected individuals  
Transition rate for individuals in V1 class to V2 class 
 
The disease-free equilibrium (DFE) of model (1) is given 
by 𝐸0 = (𝑆0, 𝐼0,𝑊0, 𝑅0, 𝑉10, 𝑉20), where 𝐼0 = 𝑊0 = 𝑅0 = 0, 
𝑆0 =
𝑉1
𝑉1+(𝑉+1)̅
, 𝑉10 =
𝑉̅
𝑉1+(𝑉+1)̅
, 𝑉20 =
1̅
𝑉1+(𝑉+1)̅
  
and its effective reproduction number is: 
 
𝑅vac =


𝑢

𝑣
[

𝑣
𝑉1 +   1̅𝑢
𝑉1 + (𝑉 + 1)̅
] (2) 
  
Let 𝐸∗ = (𝑆∗, 𝐼∗,𝑊∗, 𝑅∗, 𝑉1
∗, 𝑉2
∗) denote any endemic 
equilibrium point (EEP) of model (1). The non-zero equilibria 
of the model satisfy the following quadratic equation: 
 
𝑎2(
∗)2 + 𝑎1
∗ + 𝑎0 = 0 (3) 
  
where:  𝑎2 =  (𝑅 + 𝑢)1𝑣 > 0  
             𝑎1 =  𝑢[1̅(𝑅 + 𝑣) + 𝑣𝑅(1 + ̅)] 
+
1

𝑣
[𝑉(𝑅 + 𝑢) −   𝑅] 
             𝑎0 = 𝑅𝑢𝑣[𝑉1 + (𝑉 + 1)̅](1 − 𝑅vac) 
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The quadratic Equation (3) admits at most two feasible 
solutions.  
In the absence of vaccination (i.e. ̅ = 0), solving the 
quadratic Equation (3) gives two solutions, where one of 
them, ∗ = −
𝑉

< 0, is biologically infeasible. Thus, we 
take: 
 
∗(̅ = 0) = (− 
𝑢
)
𝑅
𝑅 + 𝑢
 (4) 
  
In the case whereby susceptibles take vaccination instantly 
(i.e. ̅ → ), by rearranging equation (3) and finding the limit 
using L’Hopital’s rule, we obtain: 
 
lim
̅→ 
∗ =
[ 
1
− 
𝑣
(
1
+ 
𝑉
)]𝑅
 [
1
(𝑅 + 𝑣) + 𝑣𝑅]
 (5) 
  
B. Individual-scale Dynamics  
An efficient individual-scale model is developed based on 
a Markov process with variable transition rates derived from 
the population-scale model. That is, when the population 
dynamics reach its equilibrium (denoted by asterisk in 
superscript), the changes in a single individual’s disease state 
are governed by the following continuous-time Markov 
process [17]: 
 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝐐∗𝐱(𝑡) 
 
with initial condition 𝐱(0) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]𝑇, where 𝐱(𝑡) =
[𝑆(𝑡), 𝐼(𝑡),𝑊(𝑡), 𝑅(𝑡), 𝑉1(𝑡), 𝑉2(𝑡)]
𝑇 and: 
 
𝐐∗ =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
−∗ −  0 0 𝑅 0 𝑉
∗ −
𝑢
0 0 0 0
0 0 −
𝑣
0 0 ∗
0 
𝑢

𝑣
−𝑅 0 0
 0 0 0 −
1
0
0 0 0 0 
1
−∗ − 𝑉]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (6) 
 
In individual-scale dynamics, we denote the individual 
vaccination strategy rate with  (without bar notation). Note 
that  could either be the same or different from the 
population vaccination rate, ̅. In the context of game theory, 
the existence of a (Nash) equilibrium in a population game 
means a stable collection of individual strategies such that no 
one has any incentive to unilaterally switch his/her strategy 
[13]. Since player is regarded as playing the game against a 
single representative “individual” who plays the population 
average strategy in population games [16], the individual 
vaccination rate, , is said to be the same as the population 
vaccination rate, ̅, at Nash equilibrium, ∗ =  = ̅. Also, at 
Nash equilibrium, each player in a game is assumed to have 
selected the best response to the population’s strategy.  
       
C. Utility Calculation  
In population games, the utility (i.e. a measure of 
preference) of any strategy is dependent on both the 
individual’s strategy and population average strategy. Based 
on the assumption that nearly all individuals in the population 
use the population average strategy, the population is so large 
that its epidemic dynamics is not dramatically affected by the 
change of a single individual’s vaccination strategy [17]. 
 
Following [15], the closed form of the expected utility is 
given by: 
 
𝑈(, ̅) = [𝐟𝑇 + 𝟏𝑇(𝐅 • 𝐐∗)](ℎ𝐈 −  𝐐∗)−1𝐱(0) (7) 
 
where h represents the discount rate, 𝟏 = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]𝑇 , I 
denotes identity matrix, f is the vector of utility gains per unit 
time for individuals of each class and F gives the vector of 
instantaneous utility gains corresponds to each transition of 
state. F • Q* represents the Hadamard product. That is, the 
product of the components of F and Q*.   
When a person stays in the unvaccinated infected (resp. 
vaccinated infected) class, he/she accumulates the infection 
cost, cI (resp. cW). An instantaneous vaccination cost cV is 
being incurred to susceptibles when they move to vaccinated 
state in the V1 class. The cV includes not only the monetary 
cost (e.g. time spent) of getting vaccination, but also the 
psychological burden of developing vaccine side effects 
(VSE). Thus:  
 
             𝐟 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0
−𝑐𝐼
−𝑐𝑊
0
0
0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
,      𝐅 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
−𝑐𝑉 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0]
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
By using Equation (7) and taking lim
ℎ→ 0
ℎ𝑈(, ̅), the utility 
of strategy  to an individual in a population at steady state 
with strategy ̅ becomes: 
 
𝑈(, ̅) =
−𝑅1[𝑢1
∗ + 𝑢2]
𝑢3(
∗)2 + 𝑢4
∗ + 𝑢5
  (8) 
                                                                                   
where:  𝑢1 = (
∗ + 𝑉)𝑣𝑐𝐼 + 𝑢𝑐𝑊 
             𝑢2 = 𝑢𝑣 (
∗ + 𝑉)𝑐𝑉 
             𝑢3 =  (𝑅 + 𝑢)1𝑣  
             𝑢4 = 1𝑣[𝑉(𝑅 + 𝑢) + 𝑢𝑅 ] 
+  
𝑢
[𝑅(1 + 𝑣) + 1𝑣]  
             𝑢5 = 𝑢𝑣𝑅[𝑉1 + (𝑉 + 1) ] 
 
As all the epidemiological parameters are positive, the 
utility calculated by Equation (8) is always in negative value 
(also known as disutility). Assuming that the population 
vaccination rate ̅ is given, individuals aim to minimize the 
loss of utility (i.e. maximize the disutility) by choosing their 
own individual vaccination rate . We assume that 𝑐𝑉  𝑐𝐼 and 
write the relative cost of vaccination to cost of infection as 
𝑐 =
𝑐𝑉
𝑐𝐼
, where 0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 1. For simplicity, hereinafter, we set 
𝑅 = 𝑉 =   and 𝑐𝑊 = 𝑐𝐼 = 1. 
We then compute the rate of change in utility when the 
individual vaccination rate  is varied by differentiating the 
utility Equation (8) with respect to . By equating the 
resulting derivative to zero, we obtain the following critical 
value c: 
 
𝑐 =
∗[ 2(∗)2𝑐11 + 
∗𝑐12 + 
 2𝑐13]
 2(∗)3𝑐21 +  (
∗)2𝑐22 +  2
∗𝑐23 +  3𝑐24
 (9) 
 
where:  𝑐11 = 𝑣(1 + ) − 1𝑢 
             𝑐12 = 2𝑣(1 + ) − ( + 1)1𝑢 
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             𝑐13 = 𝑣(1 + ) − 1𝑢 
             𝑐21 = 1𝑣(𝑢 + ) 
             𝑐22 = 1𝑣[𝑢( + 2) + 2 ] 
             𝑐23 = 1𝑣( + 2 𝑢 + 𝑢) 
             𝑐24 = 1𝑢𝑣 
 
Rearranging Equation (9), we obtain the following cubic 
equation in terms of *: 
 
𝐴3(
∗)3 + 𝐴2(
∗)2 + 𝐴1
∗ + 𝐴0 = 0 (10) 
 
where: 𝐴3 = 
 2[
1

𝑣
(
𝑢
+ )𝑐 + 
1

𝑢
− 
𝑣
(
1
+ )]  
            𝐴2 =  {1𝑣[𝑢( + 2) + 2 ]𝑐 + 1𝑢( + 1) 
 −2
𝑣
(
1
+ )} 
            𝐴1 = 
 2[
1

𝑣
( + 2 
𝑢
+ 
𝑢
)𝑐 +  
1

𝑢
 
                                         −
𝑣
(
1
+ )]  
            𝐴0 = 
 3
1

𝑢

𝑣
𝑐 > 0 
 
D. Population Games Analysis  
We assume that individuals are fully rational in making 
their vaccination decision and have complete knowledge of 
the epidemiological parameters, which includes the three 
additional parameters in the two-class vaccine-induced 
immunity model, namely the duration of staying in V1 class 
after vaccination, 1, the recovery rate, v and the reduced 
transmissibility, , for vaccinated infected individuals. 
Since Equation (3) is not linear and the mathematical 
relation between ̅ and * is not necessarily one-to-one, we 
could not replace the terms * in Equation (9) explicitly with 
its corresponding ̅  in order to examine the individuals’ best 
response (of their own vaccination rate ) on the population 
vaccination rate ̅. Considering that, we define the individual 
best response correspondence, best, by subdividing the 
relative cost of vaccination, c, into the following three 
subintervals: 
 
best(𝑐) = {
0            if              𝑐 >  𝑐no
[0,)    if 𝑐inst ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐no
            if            𝑐 <  𝑐inst
 (11) 
 
By taking 𝑅 = 𝑉 = , we first substitute Equation (4) 
into Equation (9) so as to determine the critical value of the 
relative cost of vaccination to infection, c, for the zero 
vaccination rate (i.e. ∗ =  = ̅ = 0), that is, the cost 
threshold for no vaccination, cno. If: 
 
𝑐 > 𝑐no =
( − 
𝑢
)[(
1
+ )𝑘0 −  1𝑢(+ )]
 
1
(
𝑢
+ )𝑘0
 (12) 
 
where 𝑘0 = 𝑣[(1 − )𝑢 +  +  ], then no one in the 
population will vaccinate at Nash equilibrium. Similarly, by 
substituting Equation (5) into Equation (9), we conclude that 
if 
1
> 
𝑣
(
1
+ ) and 𝑐 < 𝑐inst, with 𝑐inst is given by: 
𝑐inst = 
(1𝑘1−𝑘4𝑣)[𝑘1(𝑘4𝑣−1𝑢)−𝑘3 𝑢+𝑣𝑘4𝑘5]
1𝑣{𝑘51(𝑘1)
2+𝑘1(𝑘3𝑢−𝑘5𝑘2)+𝑢𝑘3−𝑣𝑘4𝑘5}
 (13) 
  
where:  𝑘1 =    
             𝑘2 = 𝑣(1 + ) − 1 
             𝑘3 =  (1 + 𝑣) + 𝑣1 
             𝑘4 = 1 +  
             𝑘5 = 𝑢 +  
 
then the susceptibles will vaccinate instantly (i.e. ∗ =  =
̅ →  ) at Nash equilibrium. Whenever 𝑐inst ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐no, the 
(Nash) vaccination rate is finite (i.e. ∗ =  = ̅ [0,)).   
As for every cubic equation with real coefficients, there 
always exists at least one solution among the real numbers. It 
is easy to obtain the closed-form discriminant of the cubic 
equation (10) with a formula: 
 
∆ = 18𝐴3𝐴2𝐴1𝐴0 − 4𝐴2
3𝐴0 + 𝐴2
2𝐴1
2 − 4𝐴3𝐴1
3 − 27𝐴3
2𝐴0
2 (14) 
 
By taking ∆ = 0, the cubic equation (10) is said to have a 
multiple root in which all its roots are real. This implies that 
the fold (or saddle-node) bifurcation occurs in the utility 
function (8). That is, the multiple endemic equilibria * (and 
its corresponding population vaccination rates ̅, if exist) 
collide and merge into one. After some algebraic 
manipulations, we obtain the following quadratic equation in 
terms of c, which gives the location of fold bifurcation:  
 
(𝑘7)
2{(𝑏2)
2𝑐2 + 2
1

𝑣
𝑏1𝑐 + (𝑏0)
2} = 0 (15) 
 
where:  𝑏2 = 1𝑣[( − 1)𝑢 − ] 
             𝑏1 = ( − 1)𝑢[(𝑢 + )1 + 𝑘6] + (1𝑢 − 𝑘6) 
             𝑏0 =  1𝑢 − 𝑘6 
             𝑘6 = 𝑣(1 + ) 
             𝑘7 = 1𝑢(− 1)
 3 
 
Theoretically, the fold bifurcation is expected to occur at 
the root(s) of the quadratic equation (15) which exists in an 
interval 0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 1.  
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
A. The cost thresholds for no, finite and instant 
vaccination  
Based on the Equation (11), with each corresponding pair 
of cost thresholds, we could divide the c- plane into three 
different regions, namely the regions for no vaccination, 
finite vaccination and instant vaccination, respectively. 
Whenever both c and  values fall under the region of no 
(resp. instant) vaccination, we concluded that no one (resp. 
everyone) in the population will choose vaccination strategy, 
at (Nash) equilibrium.   
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(a) Various values of 1, and  = 0.85 (b) Various values of 1, and  = 0.65 (c) Various values of v, and  = 0.85 
Figure 1: The cost thresholds for no vaccination and instant vaccination. 
      
Considering that the force of infection * in the limit of ̅ →
 will be non-negative whenever 
1
> 
𝑣
(
1
+ ) (see 
Equation (5), let   𝑉), we should view the region of 
instant vaccination as an unfavourable phenomenon in the 
context of infectious diseases control. This is due to the fact 
that the region of instant vaccination corresponds to a 
circumstance whereby even though every susceptible in the 
population vaccinated instantly, the disease eradication 
would still not be achieved. That is, the effective reproduction 
number could not be further reduced to below its sub-
threshold for disease eradication. The major factor 
contributing to this could be the vaccine efficacy. Unless 
otherwise specified, the parameter values (, , 
1
, 
𝑢
, 
𝑣
,) = 
(6, 0.85, 0.15, 1, 2, 0.05) are used for all numerical 
simulations in this paper.  
Since Equation (12) is a decreasing function of , the 
impact of vaccine efficacy on the case of no vaccination could 
be easily understood. For a specific vaccine efficacy (i.e. 1 −
 ), the longer duration the vaccinated individuals acquire 
high immunity (i.e. smaller 1), the higher the cost threshold 
for no vaccination, 𝑐no (three upper curves in Figure 1(a) and 
Figure 1(b)) will be. As far as the disease control is 
concerned, the higher 𝑐no, the better it will be simply because 
individuals will not get vaccinated if the relative cost of 
vaccination, c, exceeds 𝑐no. From an individual perspective, 
higher 𝑐no implies that a player’s utility is lower if he/she 
chooses not to vaccinate, and hence a rational individual is 
most likely to vaccinate when the rate of 1 is low. It is also 
worth noting that the Nash equilibrium vaccination rate is 
always finite when the parameter value 1 is small enough 
(say, 1 = 0.15) and the vaccine efficacy is almost perfect (i.e. 
 → 0). 
By examining Figure 1(a) in which  = 0.85, we note that 
the instant vaccination will occur for  > 0.4. As for 
intermediate values of , instant vaccination occurs for lower 
relative cost if the vaccinated individuals reside longer in the 
V1 class. Ironically, whenever  → 1, the smaller 1, the 
higher relative cost of vaccination will be for instant 
vaccination threshold. This could be attributed to the mixing 
of vaccinated individuals with two classes of vaccine-induced 
immunity in the population. That is, the model (1) are more 
realistic by including assumptions that the vaccine would 
offer, on one hand, full protection to individuals with high 
immunity and on the other hand, partial protection to 
individuals with low immunity. 
 
As the cost threshold for no vaccination (i.e. Equation (12)) 
is independent of , the three upper curves in Figure 1(a) and 
Figure 1(b) are identical. Since smaller , for instance  = 
0.65, implies that the greater reduction of transmissibility for 
vaccinated infected individuals, it follows that whenever the 
vaccinated individuals reside longer in the V1 class, the 
instant vaccination occurs but the diseases may not be 
eradicated, for lower c and narrower range of low vaccine 
efficacy (Figure 1(b)). If vaccine could offer greater reduction 
of transmissibility to individuals in the V1 class, then vaccines 
would bring greater benefit to the population than to the 
individuals who pay for the cost of vaccination. For that 
reason, opting for vaccination strategy voluntarily could be 
viewed as an altruistic behaviour [18], to some extent. If most 
susceptibles are altruistic, the spontaneous vaccination rate 
will eventually reach the social optimum [19]. In contrast 
with the assumption of selfishness in the classical game 
theory, indeed, it can be suggested that altruism play an 
important role in reducing the possibility of the coexistence 
of instant vaccination and disease prevalence with the 
reduction transmissibility, , as an additional characteristic of 
vaccine in our model even if the vaccine is not fully perfect. 
Figure 1(c) illustrates the effect of v on the Nash 
equilibrium vaccination rates. The most striking feature of 
this graph is that when v increases (i.e. faster recovery for 
vaccinated infected individuals), there is a significant upward 
shift for the cost threshold of no vaccination, particularly for 
higher probability of vaccine failure. This reflects that if 
vaccine is able to protect vaccinated individuals in the V2 
class from being infected, people will probably show minimal 
concern on the duration of infection in choosing their 
vaccination strategy. On the other hand, when vaccine does 
not reduce the vaccinated individuals’ susceptibility 
considerably, then the more the vaccine is able to speed up 
recovery in breakthrough infection, the higher the cost 
threshold for no vaccination will be. This implies that 
individuals will not refuse to vaccinate even though the 
relative cost of vaccination is high (i.e. low utility) whenever 
v value is large. Also, we observe that the unfavourable 
instant vaccination occurs for lower c but larger  when the 
duration of infection for individuals in the V2 class is 
shortened. 
 
B. Multiple Equilibria of Vaccination Rates 
We solve the cubic Equation (10) numerically for  = 0.15. 
Then, the graph of equilibrium force of infection * against 
relative cost of vaccination, c, is plotted in Figure 2(a). There 
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exists at most two endemic equilibria. Besides that, the 
numerical simulation in Figure 2(a) and Equation (15) both 
give the fold bifurcation at cfold = 0.874. When the c value is 
greater than cfold, no feasible endemic equilibrium is found. 
However, when the c value is smaller than and close to cfold, 
two endemic equilibria appear. By substituting * obtained 
into the quadratic Equation (3), and solving for ̅, the Nash 
equilibrium vaccination rate versus c is depicted in Figure 
2(b). It can be seen that neither instant vaccination nor 
multiple Nash equilibria vaccination rates are found for the 
parameter values used in Figure 2 in our vaccination 
population game with two-class vaccine-induced immunity. 
  
(a) (b)  
Figure 2: Dependence of * and * on c, for  = 6 and  = 0.15 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3: Dependence of * and * on c, for  = 18 and  = 0.15 
 
We then explore the extent to which a highly contagious 
disease could alter the individual vaccination decision-
making by increasing the disease transmission rate from  = 
6 to  = 18, for  = {0.85, 0.65, 0.15}. As ∗(̅ = 0) = 0.810, 
in Figure 3(a), we discard the graph whenever the numerical 
simulation produces ∗ > 0.810. Likewise, the * in Figure 
3(a) shows the fold bifurcation does occur. This complicates 
the individual vaccination decision-making in the cases of  
= 18 whereby three Nash equilibria vaccination rates (i.e. two 
non-zero vaccination rates and one zero vaccination rate) 
appear in the interval 0.861  c  0.874 (Figure 3(b)). Since 
 is only implicitly appear in quadratic equation (3) through 
∗ =  
𝐼∗+ 𝑊∗
𝑁∗
, Figure 3(b) reveals that the greater reduction 
of transmissibility for vaccinated infected individuals (i.e. 
smaller ), the lower possibility that the unfavourable 
phenomenon of instant vaccination coexists with prevalent 
infectious diseases will be. For example, although its 
corresponding * are non-zero when the c values are small for 
all three values of , we find that the Nash equilibrium 
strategy for  = 0.15 is finite vaccination (i.e. * < 1), whereas 
for    0.65, the instant vaccination (i.e. * > 1) occurs. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
By using a two-class vaccine-induced immunity SVIRS 
model in the framework of vaccination population games, we 
find that the additional characteristics of imperfect vaccine 
may alter the individuals’ best response for vaccination 
strategy and consequently its epidemic dynamics. These 
characteristics complicate individuals vaccination behaviour 
and should not be overlooked in the effort of controlling 
infectious diseases by voluntary vaccination programme.   
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